Macroeconomic Determinants of Workers’ Remittances and Compensation of Employees in Sub-Saharan Africa by Adenutsi, Deodat E.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Macroeconomic Determinants of
Workers’ Remittances and Compensation
of Employees in Sub-Saharan Africa
Deodat E. Adenutsi
University of Stellenbosch
9. February 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60620/
MPRA Paper No. 60620, posted 15. December 2014 05:47 UTC
  
 
T h e   J o u r n a l   o f   D e v e l o p i n g   A r e a s 
Volume 48                               No. 1                       Winter 2014 
MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF WORKERS’ 
REMITTANCES AND COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
 
Deodat E. Adenutsi 
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences 
Graduate School of Business 
University of Stellenbosch 
Republic of South Africa 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to identify the macroeconomic determinants of migrant remittances received in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) at the disaggregated level. The underlying motivation is that, given their unique characteristics, permanent 
and temporary migrants are likely to respond differently to macroeconomic conditions in migrant-host countries and their native 
or migrant-home countries. For the empirical analysis, the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach was used 
to estimate a dynamic panel-data model involving 36 SSA countries over the period, 1980-2009. It was found that the inflows of 
compensation of employees and workers‟ remittances to SSA are influenced by host-country macroeconomic conditions in a 
similar way, whereas these two forms of remittances are driven by contrasting home-country macroeconomic conditions. 
Remittances from permanent migrants are less altruistic than remittances from temporary migrants. To attract higher remittances 
on a more permanent basis, the implementation of stable macroeconomic and pro-growth policies are inevitable in labor-
exporting SSA countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the United Nations (2009), Europe leads as the main host of migrants with 32.6 
percent of international migrant stock, followed by Asia (28.6 percent), North America (23.4 
percent), Africa (9 percent), Oceania (2.8 percent) and Latin America (2.4 percent). Clearly, the 
net international migration trend is South-North, given the widening income gap and contrasting 
working conditions between the industrialized North and the impoverished South. Although 
labor-exporting countries may suffer from brain-drain, these low-income countries have been 
benefiting directly by way of international remittances. This could be the most obvious 
explanation as to why developing countries are the main destinations of migrant remittances with 
the industrialized world maintaining its status as the main source of remittance flows
1
. It is also 
not surprising that remittances have, over the past three decades, emerged strongly as an 
alternative source of development finance in many developing countries. 
In recent years, official remittances alone surpass Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India, China, Mexico, Philippines, Lesotho, and 
in many other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia.
2
 Official migrant 
remittances received by developing countries reached US$116 billion in 2003 representing more 
than 1.5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP)
3
. In 2004, migrant remittances of 
US$126 billion became the second most important source of foreign exchange earnings to 
developing countries (World Bank, 2006). This was the year in which FDI to developing 
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countries stood at US$165 billion with gross ODA amounting to US$79 billion (World Bank, 
2006). Recorded migrant remittances received by developing countries rose to US$194.2 billion 
in 2005, reaching an all-time high of US$336 billion in 2008 before plummeting to US$316 
billion in 2009, in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (World Bank, 2010). Still, 
the relatively superior importance of migrant remittances over other capital inflows in 
developing countries, with respect to size, growth rate and stability, remains unchanged over the 
past four decades as the decline in 2009 is only the second after the first was recorded in 1985. 
 Despite the general positive growth trend in migrant remittances, and also having being a 
major exporter of migrants, it is puzzling that SSA as a sub-region has remained the least 
recipient of official migrant remittances in terms of actual volume and per capita (see Figure A2 
in the Appendix), a situation that raises a lot of questions. Is there anything macroeconomic 
policy environment can do to increase official remittances received by SSA?  Which of the 
components of migrant remittances do macroeconomic factors most affect, and in which 
direction? In other words, do macroeconomic factors impact differently on compensation of 
employees and workers’ remittances? These pertinent questions are the motivation for verifying 
if macroeconomic factors have any distinctive impact on workers’ remittances and compensation 
of employees as separate components of migrant remittances in SSA. Understanding the 
macroeconomic factors underlying the inflows of workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees is crucial for the formulation of a relevant, effective and integrated policy towards 
mobilizing optimal remittances in SSA. This is because each of these components of remittances 
has its own distinct features. For instance, workers’ remittances are the funds transferred by 
migrants who have settled outside their home countries for at least 12 months, and hence, are 
more associated with permanent migration; whilst compensation of employees is more associated 
with temporary migration as it comprises funds transferred from migrants with less than 12 
months‟ settlement outside their home countries. In order to find answers to the questions as 
posed above, 36 SSA countries for which relevant balanced data over the past three decades, 
1980-2009 exists, were sampled for the empirical analysis. The remaining part of this paper is 
organized as follows. Some stylized facts on the trend and magnitude of remittance inflows are 
provided in Section 2. This is followed by the literature review and theoretical framework in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical model as well as the methodological approach. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Conclusions, policy implications and 
recommendations follow in Section 6. 
 
REMITTANCE FLOWS TO SSA: SOME STYLIZED FACTS 
 
Figure 1 shows the composition and the level of dependency on migrant remittances in the 36 
SSA countries sampled for the empirical analysis in this study. An important observation from 
Figure 1 is that, migrant remittances received by SSA are largely dominated by workers‟ 
remittances irrespective of whether or not a country is a high-remittance dependent or low-
remittance dependent. Only four countries, (Lesotho, Botswana, Congo and Tanzania), rely more 
on compensation of employees than on workers‟ remittances. Apart from Congo, these are all 
countries in the southern part of the sub-region, members of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and neighbours of the Republic of South Africa. This underscores the fact 
that temporary migration is more common among countries in the southern part of SSA than 
elsewhere within the sub-region. It is likely that, unlike nationals of other parts within the sub-
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region, nationals of SADC countries might find it relatively easier, cheaper and more convenient 
to migrate temporarily to neighboring South Africa, the economy that  can be described as 
„industrialized‟ based on the continental and sub-regional standards.  
 
 
FIGURE 1. COMPOSITION AND DEPENDENCY OF SSA COUNTRIES ON MIGRANT 
REMITTANCES, 1980-2009 
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Panel A: Top-12 Migrant Remittances-Dependent SSA Countries 
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Panel B: Bottom-12 Migrant Remittances-Dependent SSA Countries 
REMPC WREMPC COMPPC  
Source: Compiled by the author based on sources cited in Table A2 covering only the 36 sampled countries.  
Note: REMPC, WREMPC and COMPC denote migrant remittances per capita, workers‟ remittances per capita and 
compensation of employees per capita respectively. 
 
 
In terms of income status, there is no distinctive pattern of dominance in either category 
as relatively high-income countries such as Cameroon and Congo are listed among the least 
migrant remittance-dependents just as other high-income countries like Seychelles, Cape Verde, 
Mauritius and Botswana are listed among the high migrant remittance-dependents. It is shown in 
Figure 1 Panel A that, with the exception of Cape Verde, SADC countries viz. Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles and Botswana, dominate the top-6 migrant remittance-
dependent countries. The remaining top-12 migrant remittance-dependents (Cape Verde, 
Senegal, Sudan, Gambia, Benin and Togo) are predominantly West African countries. Comoros 
is the only country from the eastern part of the sub-region listed among the top-12 remittance-
dependents. The geographical background of the bottom-third of migrant remittance-dependent 
countries is quite heterogeneous, but with West African countries dominating with five countries 
(Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Ghana) out of the 12 in the bottom category. 
Central and Eastern Africa has four countries (Cameroon, Congo, Rwanda, and Ethiopia) with 
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SADC having three of its members (Madagascar, Tanzania and Malawi) among countries with 
least dependency on migrant remittances. Again, Panel B is dominated by countries with 
relatively large geographical size such as Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Congo, Madagascar and 
Tanzania. Despite this, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Malawi, with relatively small 
geographical sizes, are also included in this category of countries with the least dependency. 
Thus, with reference to SSA, migrant remittances flow to both high-income and low-
income SSA countries and these remittances do not depend necessarily on the geographical size 
or location of the country. This implies that some macroeconomic policies must be responsible 
for the changing and unequal flow of migrant remittances received by SSA as a sub-region.  
Literature suggests the inclusion of both home-country and the host-country factors in 
identifying the macroeconomic factors that explain variations in migrant remittances received by 
developing countries (see Section 3). Most cross-country empirical studies on macroeconomic 
determinants of remittances tend to use the United States of America (USA) as the migrant-host 
country. A few other authors including Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), Lianos (1997), and Bouhga-
Hagbe (2004) made attempts at using countries other than the USA as the migrant-host nation in 
country-specific studies at the macro-level, with the focus on bilateral remittances. In the case of 
SSA countries, however, majority of the migrants, at least 70 percent, migrate to reside in other 
SSA countries.
4
 This makes the pattern of migration among citizens of SSA unique compared to 
the rest of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that SSA still serves as the main host of its „own 
migrants‟, the most important source of international remittances to the various SSA countries is 
the SSA migrants residing in countries outside the sub-region (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bollard et 
al., 2010).  In Table 1 a list of the 36 sampled SSA countries and the main hosts of their citizens 
living outside SSA is presented. 
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TABLE 1. HOST COUNTRIES OF SSA MIGRANTS RESIDENT OUTSIDE SSA 
Country Code Country Name Non-SSA Host-Country Country Code Country Name Non-SSA Host-Country
1 Benin (BEN) France (FRA) 19 Mali (MLI) France (FRA)
2 Botswana (BSW) Great Britain (GBR) 20 Mauritania (MRT) France (FRA)
3 Burkina Faso (BFA) Pakistan (PAK) 21 Mauritius (MRS) France (FRA)
4 Cameroon (CAM) France (FRA) 22 Mozambique (MZQ) Portugal (POR)
5 Cape Verde (CPV) Portugal (POR) 23 Namibia (NAM) Great Britain (GBR)
6 Comoros (COM) France (FRA) 24 Niger (NGR) Germany (GER)
7 Congo Republic (CON) France (FRA) 25 Nigeria (NIG) United States of America (USA)
8 Côte d'Ivoire (CIV) France (FRA) 26 Rwanda (RWA) Belgium (BEL)
9 Ethiopia (ETH) United States of America (USA) 27 São Tomé & Príncipe (ST&P) Portugal (POR)
10 Gabon (GAB) France (FRA) 28 Senegal (SEN) France (FRA)
11 Gambia (GAM) Spain (ESP) 29 Seychelles (SEY) Great Britain (GBR)
12 Ghana (GHA) United States of America (USA) 30 Sierra Leone (SLE) United States of America (USA)
13 Guinea (GUI) Great Britain (GBR) 31 South Africa (RSA) Great Britain (GBR)
14 Guinea-Bissau (GBS) Portugal (POR) 32 Sudan (SUD) Saudi Arabia (SAU)
15 Kenya (KEN) Great Britain (GBR) 33 Swaziland (SWZ) Great Britain (GBR)
16 Lesotho (LSO) Germany (GER) 34 Tanzania (TNZ) Great Britain (GBR)
17 Madagascar (MAD) France (FRA) 35 Togo (TOG) France (FRA)
18 Malawi (MLI) Great Britain (GBR) 36 Uganda (UGA) Great Britain (GBR)  
Source: Author’s compilation from Parson et al. (2007) according to the number of SSA migrants resident abroad. 
 
 A key feature in the pattern of SSA international migration as shown in Table 1 is that 
most of its migrants reside in Europe rather than in the Americas. Factors such as distance or 
travelling cost, geopolitical history or former colonial relationship, lingual Franca and religious 
affinities underlie the choice of destination of SSA international migrants. For instance, 
international migrants from Francophone SSA countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, 
Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire, Mauritania and Senegal are hosted by France with which they have a 
common language. These SSA countries were also colonized by France in the past. The same 
trend is easily visible in the case of migrants from Portuguese-speaking countries (Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau) and migrants from English speaking 
countries such as Kenya, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, and Uganda. Regarding 
religious affinities, SSA migrants from Muslim-dominated countries such as Burkina Faso, 
Benin, Niger and Sudan are commonly resident in countries like Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia with common religion dominance.  
 It can be seen in Table 1 that France (12), Great Britain (10), United States of America 
(4), Portugal (4) and Germany (2) are the first-choice hosts of SSA migrants outside the sub-
region. This implies that Europe leads as the main host of SSA international migrants
5
. Belgium, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Spain are also the leading host countries for migrants from Rwanda, 
Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Gambia respectfully. Clearly, using USA as the main host of SSA 
migrants in an empirical study aimed at analyzing the determinants of migrant remittance 
inflows in SSA should not be considered appropriate. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Literature Review on Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
 
Contributing to the debate initiated by Lucas and Stark (1985) on the determination of 
remittances, Russell (1986), Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), Lianos (1997), Vargas-Silva and 
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Huang (2006), and Coulibaly (2009) contend that macroeconomic performance can affect the 
flow of remittances. The altruistic theory of remittances from the macroeconomic perspective 
suggests that remittances are higher when negative shocks and high frictions in the labor market 
occur in low-income countries, creating an incentive for the active population to migrate to the 
industrialized world in search of higher-wage jobs
6
. Given an existing strong social tie between a 
migrant and his/her family left behind, the theory of pure altruism predicts that the migrant will  
remit more funds to his/her family back home during severe economic hardships in the home 
country and reduce both the amount and the frequency of funds transferred during economic 
boom at home.  Accordingly, with a decrease in real per capita income (or during economic 
recession), inflation episodes, exchange rate instability and constraints in the credit market of a 
typical labor-exporting country, the migrant is expected to remit more money and to remit more 
regularly to his/her family back home (Wahba, 1991; Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006). This 
suggests that higher growth in real per capita GDP in the labor-exporting country relative to the 
income growth rate in the industrialized labor-importing country should impact negatively on 
remittance inflows to developing countries (Swamy, 1981; Brown, 1997). 
Even though the above expositions imply from pure altruistic theory that migrant 
remittances should flow in a countercyclical pattern as they respond to negative income shocks 
in remittance-recipient countries, empirical evidence has been mixed. For instance, whilst El-
Sakka and McNabb (1999), Bouhga-Hagbe (2006), Yang and Choi (2007), and Singh et al. 
(2010) provide evidence on the countercyclical property of remittances, Higgins et al. (2004), 
Aydaş et al. (2004) and Adenutsi et al. (2012) find that the pattern of remittance flows is 
procyclical as it tends to rise with increased GDP per capita and higher growth rate in 
remittance-receiving countries. Sayan (2006) and Adenutsi et al. (2011) also find that in most 
cases remittances are either acyclical or procyclical. 
The theory of self-interest motive underlying the flow of migrant remittances, which is 
closely synonymous with the portfolio choice theory, implies that as economic conditions in 
labor-exporting countries improve relative to the labor-importing country, more remittances are 
received in the labor-exporting countries through higher migrant savings and investment 
(Russell, 1986; Wahba, 1991; Coulibaly, 2009). For instance, increased real per capita income in 
a migrant‟s native country is considered by the migrant as a positive signal of higher return on 
investment at home. Also, with higher economic prospects at home, a migrant, who hitherto had 
lost confidence at home and decided never to return home, could now consider returning home in 
the future. Such a migrant can increase his/her savings at home. It is for this reason that a higher 
real deposit interest rate of a migrant‟s home country relative to the migrant‟s host country is 
expected to impact positively on remittance inflows in the labor-exporting country. In like 
manner, as the national currency of a migrant‟s home country becomes stronger and stable 
domestically (low inflation) and internationally (exchange appreciation), the migrant may regain 
his/her confidence in his/her home country and, consequently, remit more funds home for the 
commencement of income-generating projects. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, Lucas and Stark (1985) again argue that remittances can be 
driven by mixed motives rather than pure altruism and pure self-interest. This is most likely to be 
the case at the macroeconomic level where it is apparent that altruistic and self-interest theories 
underlying remittance flows are not mutually exclusive. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
although, theoretically, remittances can be analyzed from the altruistic and portfolio perspectives 
at the micro-level, virtually in all the macro-level studies on determinants of remittances, 
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economic models are formulated from the mixed motive viewpoint, which involves a 
combination of pure altruistic motive and pure self-interest motive.  
Various empirical studies including those of Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), Lianos (1997), 
Aydaş et al. (2004), Freund and Spatafora (2005), Gupta (2005), Schrooten (2005), Vargas-Silva 
and Huang (2006) and Singh et al. (2010) show that size of  migrant stock, host-country versus 
home-country income gap, exchange rate fluctuations, deposit interest rates; political risk, access 
to international money transfer facilities and the economic conditions in migrant-host countries 
affect the volume and frequency of remittance flows. As to whether or not a migrant may remit 
through the formal or an informal money transfer channel, the level of financial development as 
reflected in the cost of funds transfer, the existence or absence of dual exchange rate at home, 
availability of financial infrastructure and innovative products, in especially labor-exporting 
countries, play an important role.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Drawing lessons from Lucas and Stark (1985) and in the spirit of Vargas-Silva and Huang 
(2006), an optimal control theoretical framework designed to analyze the dynamics of remittance 
inflows was developed in this study. In this framework, a representative migrant maximizes 
his/her „lifetime‟ consumption and transfers to his/her family at home based on his/her income 
constraint, „initial divergence‟ constraint and „impetus effect‟ constraint. The utility function has 
a composite consumption goods and transfers (remittances) as its elements. The income 
constraint reflects the fact that the migrant‟s total disposable income must be equal to the total 
expenditure on his/her current consumption of composite goods, transfers (i.e. remittances) and 
financial asset holdings. Although it is assumed that the holding of financial assets is a „residual‟ 
activity by the migrant because he/she aims at returning home after some time
7
, financial asset 
holdings might enter the migrant‟s utility function directly. The initial divergence constraint 
highlights the initial differences in the migrant‟s home-country and the host-country conditions. 
It is essentially a total wealth constraint. The „impetus effect‟ constraint suggests that the total 
amount of funds transferred is dependent upon the prevailing economic conditions and 
regulatory environment in the migrant‟s home country. The transversality conditions were 
imposed to reflect the fact that no household or individual can be in a „ponzi-game‟ situation. In 
other words, no one can continue borrowing perpetually without loan repayment. That is, at the 
terminal stage, the migrant must repay all his/her debt. For optimality in consumption, the 
individual dies with no savings. 
The steady state solution to the model using optimal control technique reveals the 
quantity of composite goods and the amount of fund transfers (remittances) that the individual 
migrant chooses at the steady state to maximize his/her utility and the variables that influence 
such a decision. With these, the explicit inter-temporal equilibrium relationships between the 
inflows of remittances and other relevant macroeconomic conditions at home and abroad are 
established. 
Using a two-period scenario, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) model the inflow of 
remittances to developing countries under the assumptions that period one represents an initial 
stage of international migration of an individual, typically from a less developed country (the 
home country) to a more developed country (the host country). During this period, the individual 
(the migrant) does not migrate with his/her direct dependants (family). Thus, the economically 
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active migrant resides in a relatively industrialized country where he/she is engaged in an-
income-generating economic activity whilst his/her dependants continue to live in his/her low-
income native (home) country. In this context, the utility of the migrant depends on his/her 
personal consumption in the host country ( )fC and the consumption of his/her family ( )hC living 
his/her native country. Accordingly, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) specify that the utility 
function of the migrant in the initial period of migration is given as ( , )f hU C C with 1 0U  , 
11 0,U  2 0U  , 22 0;U  and under the assumption that utility is additively separable
8
. The 
consumption expenditure of the migrant‟s household living at home is dependent upon the 
income and remittances received ( )r with  which is the cost of transferring funds from the host 
country to the home country being of the form, 1  . This implies that although a migrant remits 
r  dollars back home, only a fraction of this amount r is received by his/her family. 
The income received by the migrant‟s household living at home is made up of two 
components and given as h hY Y  with  capturing the relationship between the economic 
conditions in the migrant‟s native country and the average income earned by his/her family 
living at home. hY  is the fraction of the household income that is not susceptible to changes in 
the macroeconomic conditions of the home country, whilst hY  is the part of the household 
income that is predisposed to changes in macroeconomic environment of the home country. It is 
assumed that 0  which implies that an improvement in the economic conditions of the home 
country is associated with an improvement in the household income, even though the magnitude 
of  may differ across households. The consumption of the migrant‟s household living at home 
is given by (( ), )h h hC Y Y r  . This consumption function is additively separable with 
1
0,hC  2 110, 0h hC C  and 22 0.hC   Likewise, the income of the migrant is in the form 
f fy Y such that  reflects the relationship between the economic conditions in the host 
country and the income the migrant earns in the host country. 
The income constraint of the migrant during this first/initial period can, thus, be given as 
f f fy Y C r s    in which case 0  with r  being the proportion of the migrant‟s disposable 
income which he/she remits home, whilst s  represents the fraction of migrant‟s income saved in 
the home country. Here again, fy is the portion of the migrant‟s disposable income in the initial 
stages that is not susceptible to varying macroeconomic conditions of the host country. Similarly, 
fY is the portion of household income that is susceptible to changes in the economic condition 
of the host country ( ).fY  
During the second period (i.e. at the latter stages) of migration, the migrant‟s household 
migrates to a foreign industrialized country, often, joining the migrant in his/her host country
9
. If 
this assumption holds, then the optimization migrant problem is given as follows: 
 ( , ) ( )f h zMaxU C C V C      (1) 
 { , , }C r s  
subject to 
 f f fy Y C r s          (2) 
and 
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 (1 )z z zC y Y i s         (3) 
where ( )zV C denotes the utility from second period consumption so that 1 0V   and 11 0V  ,  is 
a discount factor, i is the interest rate (intuitively the deposit rate) of the home country, with 
zy and zY having similar interpretations to fy and fY but for the second period. Finding the first-
order conditions of this problem yields Equations (4) and (5): 
 1 1(1 )U V i        (4) 
 2 1(1 )rhU C V i         (5) 
From Equations (4) and (5), it is possible to derive r with respect to host country income 
( fY ) as shown in Equation (6) below: 
 
2
11 11(1 ) 0
f
U V ir
Y D
 
 

    (6) 
where D, the determinant of the matrix of the second derivatives, is 
2 2 2 2 2
11 11 11 22 2 11 22 2(1 ) (1 ) (( ) ) 0r rr r rrh h h hD U V i V i U C U C U C U C U            
 for a maximum 
(Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006). The central implication of Equation (6) is that an improvement 
in the economic conditions of the host country positively affects remittance flows from the host 
country to the migrant‟s home country. This is so because an increase in Y implies improvements 
in economic conditions in host country which enable a migrant to remit more as 0;  given that 
households spend their incomes on normal goods. In equation (7), it is also shown that an 
improvement in the economic conditions of the migrant‟s home country is associated with a 
decrease in remittance inflows in the remittance-receiving country. 
 
 
2
22 11 11(1 )
( ) 0
r y
h
h h
h
U C C U V ir
Y D
         
 
 
  (7) 
 
Impliedly, Equation (7) is non-positive when a migrant is remitting for altruistic 
purposes. Under this assumption, the migrant remits fewer funds to his/her family in the home 
country because the target household is better off 0.   Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) prove 
that changes in remittances as a result of changes in the rate of interest in the host country could 
have two contrasting effects for which reason the sign of Equation (8) is indeterminate unless 
further assumptions are made. 
 
  11 1 11(1 )U V V i sr
i D
   
  
  
    (8) 
 
Thus, from Equation (8), on one hand, if there is a higher real rate of interest on deposits 
in the host country a rational migrant who is driven by a non-altruistic motive may reduce the 
amount of funds remitted to his/her home country and increase his/her savings in the host 
country. On the other hand, if real deposit interest rate in the host country increases, a migrant 
can now consume more in the future and since remittances form part of the consumption basket 
of the consumer, during the second period, funds remitted to the home country may increase.  
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However, a typical non-altruistic SSA migrant is more likely to react more to changes to 
real interest rate in his/her home country than in the host country, the reason being that the rate 
of inflation in a migrant host-country is likely to be lower than the rate recorded in his/her home 
country, making real deposit rates lower and more erratic at home than abroad. Apart from this, 
migrants under implicit social contract would still be compared forcibly to remit home, 
irrespective of changes in the returns on financial assets in their respective host countries. With 
higher deposit rate at home, migrants with the intention of returning home after some time may 
be motivated to remit through banks and other money deposit institutions or Money Transfer 
Operators (MTOs) within the formal financial sector. Higher real interest rates on deposits at 
home are an indication of improved financial sector development through competition and risk 
diversification. In other words, local banks in the migrant home country are likely to mobilize 
more private funds in the form of remittances from migrants living abroad if real deposit rates 
are positive and attractive. Accordingly, in an attempt to respond to what macroeconomic policy 
SSA countries must implement to attract higher inflow of migrant remittances through the 
official channels, the role of the domestic financial sector and, for that matter, the level of real 
deposit interest rate in the home countries should be more imperative. This is why in the 
presence of the same level of deposit interest rates in the host-country (in this case France) 
countries like Benin, Comoros, Mauritius, Senegal and Togo received more official remittances 
than their compatriots like Cameroon, Congo, Madagascar and Mauritania notwithstanding the 
fact that France is the leading host of the migrants from these SSA countries. Thus, the use of 
home-country deposit interest rate rather than interest rate differential between the host country 
and the home country is the fundamental modification made to the Vargas-Silva and Huang 
theoretical framework. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The empirical model of this study is based on an extended Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) 
theoretical framework within an analytical framework of a dynamic panel-data estimation 
technique of Blundell and Bond (1998) system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). 
Equation (9) represents the general dynamic panel-data model. 
 ,it i i t l it itR R x              (9) 
where the residuals ( )it  are white noise such that 
2(0, )it N   , 
2. . (0, )i i i d    and  is a 
scalar such that 1  ; 1,2,3,....,i N is an index for individual sampled SSA countries, 
implying 36N  ; 1,2,3,....,t T is an index for time-variant periods, in this case, years, so that 
30T  for the overall-study period, 1980-2009. The endogenous variable R is a measure of 
remittances either as workers’ remittances per capita (WREMPC) or compensation of employees 
per capita (COMPPC). itx is a row vector of explanatory variables excluding the lagged 
dependent variable with the dimension k where 1k n   and n is the number of exogenous 
variables. ,i t lR  is included as an explanatory variable so as to capture the theoretical conviction 
of dynamic effects of remittance inflows which suggests that migrant remittances could either 
decay or decrease in value overtime, often by the second-generation as family and social ties 
become weak (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Glytsos, 1997). 
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 The explanatory and not strictly exogenous variables are real deposit interest rate of a 
typical SSA country (RIR)
10
, real exchange rate (RXR), migrant-host country income (MGY), 
migrant-home country income (FMY), home-country CPI-based inflation rate (INF), bank credit 
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP in the home country (PSC), and institutional quality 
(INS). A time-dummy (D1) was introduced to capture post-September 11, 2001; such that 
1 0D   for 1980-2001, and 1 1D   for 2002-2009. The introduction of D1 is also important as it 
helps to prevent any possible cross-individual correlation or contemporaneous correlation. 
 unknown parameter of the lagged endogenous variable;  is the unknown parameter vector of 
the k exogenous variables; l  is the number of significant lags carried by the endogenous 
variable; and i  individual specific fixed effects. This model is also based on the assumptions 
that: (i) the error term is orthogonal to the exogenous variables so that, ( ) 0;it itE x   (ii) the error 
term ( . . )i i d is uncorrelated with the lagged endogenous variable implying that , 1( ) 0;i t itE R   and 
(iii) the exogenous variables might be correlated with the individual effect in which case 
( ) 0.it iE x     
 Equation (9) also shows that there are 2T   orthogonality restrictions in levels which are 
exploited; hence observation t  in levels was used for the estimation, where differences are used 
as valid instruments, as it is assumed that x is at least predetermined.  
A more specific version of Equation (9) can be specified as: 
, 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
1
n
i t i t n i t n i t n i t n i t n i t n i tR R FMY MGY PSC INS INF RXR 

             

           
       
7 , 8 , ,1n i t n i t i tRIR D            (10) 
 
where home-country income (FMY) and host-country income (MGY) are in their natural 
logarithmic forms, and hence denoted as FMY and MGY respectively. 
To circumvent the highly possible presence of endogeneity in the empirical model that 
has a panel structure of small T  and large ,N  the analytical approach appealed to the system 
GMM estimation so as to obtain efficient, reliable and unbiased estimators. It is, thus, 
acknowledged that the underlying relationship of the empirical model is linear; the left-hand side 
variable is singular and dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; the explanatory 
variables are not strictly exogenous; there are fixed individual effects; and there are 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the cross-sectional units but not across them (Behr, 
2003; Roodman, 2006). The Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimation technique is a 
preferred choice over the „difference‟ GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
„deviation‟ GMM suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) because in system GMM, it is 
possible to include time-invariant regressors which tend to disappear in „difference‟ GMM 
(Roodman, 2006). Furthermore, „difference‟ GMM and „deviation‟ GMM are known to be 
inefficient when instruments are weak as they rely on information contained in differences only, 
but in the Blundell-Bond (1998) framework, additional relevant information besides the 
differences is utilized. Therefore, by allowing for more instruments, the estimated parameters of 
system GMM are not only more efficient, but also more consistent than other alternative 
techniques of dynamic panel-data analysis.  
Dynamic panel-data system GMM methodological approach involves estimating a set of 
simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and the other 
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in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). System GMM panel estimator is 
considered the most reliable in exploiting the initial condition in generating efficient estimators 
of a dynamic panel when T  is small relative to N (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Using ity as a 
dependent variable, Blundell and Bond (1998) prove that an additional mild stationarity 
restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system GMM estimator 
that utilizes lagged differences of ity as instruments for equations in first differences. This 
endowment of the system GMM estimator is very important in estimating the macroeconomic 
factors that influence international remittance flows to SSA since strict exogeneity of the right-
hand side variables rules out any possibility of feedback from the current and past shocks to the 
current values of the remittance flows. Normally, in the context of macroeconomic models 
relating to several jointly determined outcomes and in consistency with the theories underlying 
migrant remittance inflows, current level of remittances can be influenced by how much was 
remitted in the past as social ties weaken overtime (often by the second generation) resulting in 
remittances decreasing in value with duration of stay (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Merkle and 
Zimmermann, 1992; Glytsos, 1997). 
To test for the joint validity of the instruments used, the Sargan-Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions was performed as suggested by Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006). The 
Arellano-Bond zero-correlation test was performed to be certain that there is no second-order 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term. 
 
Data Issues 
 
Low frequency highly-balanced panel data from secondary sources was used in this study. The 
relevant annual series were collated on 36 SSA countries for the period, 1980-2009. The 
selection of the 36 SSA countries (listed in Table 1 above) was based strictly on data availability. 
In other words, the sample size was determined strictly by availability of consistent data on 
relevant variables, particularly migrant remittances. The key variable of focus and the variable 
measurement which posed the greatest challenge is migrant remittances. The choice of the start 
date was contingent upon the desire to cover as many countries as possible for higher 
representation of the population rather than covering longer periods with limited coverage of 
sample units.  
In this paper, migrant remittances constitute the sum of workers’ remittances recorded in 
the current account of the balance of payments under the heading “current transfers”; and 
compensation of employees recorded under the “income” sub-category of the current account. 
This implies that compensation of employees is the net of migrant remittances less workers’ 
remittances. Details about migrant remittances and the components were obtained mainly from 
the 2010 World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank based on the 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (BoPS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Other sources such as estimates based on IMF country-specific desks were used to fill in missing 
data where possible
11
. 
The main explanatory variables are the traditional macroeconomic variables notably 
migrant-host country income, migrant-home country income, rate of inflation, exchange rate, 
interest rate, and private sector credit obtained essentially from the International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO), as well as the World Bank‟s 
WDI.   
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The rate of inflation obtained from WDI, IFS and WEO is defined and measured as the 
annual percentage change in consumer price index of a typical SSA migrant-home country. Real 
exchange rate (RXR) is the annual average value of the national currency of a sampled SSA 
country in real terms of the national currency of the migrant-host country. The author computed 
RXR by multiplying the bilateral nominal exchange rate of a given SSA by the ratio of the host-
country CPI to the home-country CPI based on reported data obtained from WDI, IFS and WEO. 
From these same sources, real deposit interest rate (RIR) was measured by the author as the 
average annual deposit rate of a typical SSA country minus average annual CPI-based inflation 
rate of the home country. Host-country income which was used to proxy migrant income is the 
real per capita GDP of a typical non-SSA migrant-host country
12
. Home-country income which 
was used to proxy family income is the real per capita GDP of a typical sampled SSA country. 
Both MGY and FMY were obtained from WDI and WEO. Domestic credit to private sector as a 
ratio of GDP (PSC) is the total domestic credit to the private sector by the financial system as a 
ratio of nominal GDP. The main sources of PSC are WDI and the Central Bank website of 
selected sampled SSA countries. 
Institutional quality index (INS) extracted from the popular Marshall and Jaggers (2011) 
is the polity2 index used to capture the qualities of democratic governance and institutions in a 
typical SSA home-country. It ranges between -10 for low democratic governance (including 
dictatorship and autocratic regimes) and weak institutions and +10 for high democratic 
governance and strong institutions. Finally, the post-September 2011 effect on international 
migrant remittance flows to SSA was captured by a dummy that takes the value of zero for 
periods preceding 2002 and one for the years 2002 and beyond. Table A2 in the Appendix 
summarizes the definition and main sources of data as well as the expected empirical relationship 
between each of the explanatory variables and international migrant remittances.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The findings of the study are presented in Table 2. The results of the diagnostic tests suggest that 
the efficiency and reliability of the estimated parameters are not undermined by the choice of 
invalid instruments or second-order autocorrelation. A one percent level of statistical 
significance of the Wald statistics shows that the explanatory variables jointly explain the 
dependent variable in the models. 
 The results of this study suggest that, although in a contrasting manner, both home-
country and host-country macroeconomic conditions are crucial determinants of migrant 
remittances irrespective of duration of stay. Whereas factors relating to economic conditions in 
host countries, notably changing levels in host-country income, real bilateral exchange rate and 
law enforcement to clampdown on the use of informal money transfer channels seem to have the 
same effect on both category of migrants, the influence of macroeconomic conditions in the 
home country has a sharply contrasting impact on migrants, depending upon their duration 
status. For example, with a percentage rise in the income level in a host country, the amount of 
remittances sent by permanent migrants and temporary migrants can rise by 9.99 and 10.45 per 
cent respectively. Similarly, following tighter regulations of international money transfers and 
clampdown on the use of informal transfer channels in the aftermath of the September-11 Al 
Qaeda attacks, remittances from both categories of migrants increased, with a higher increase in 
the case of permanent migrants. Probably this is because, given their longer duration of stay, 
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permanent migrants,  unlike temporary migrants, might have had better insight and, hence, 
higher patronage of informal transfer channels in the past to avoid paying commission on  funds 
transferred to the native countries. Real appreciation of bilateral exchange rate results in higher 
funds transfer from permanent as well as temporary migrants, with a relatively higher impact on 
remittances from temporary migrants. If it is assumed that temporary migrants are under pressure 
to remit at all costs because their trips were collectively funded by family members or to offset 
personal loans contracted prior to migration, this category of migrants will have to remit more 
funds (in relative terms of the host-country currency) when exchange rate appreciates, in order to 
settle the target recipients at home with the same value (in the home-country currency) of regular 
„installment‟ or remittance mutually agreed on by parties in the implicit contract. 
 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF WORKERS’ REMITTANCES AND COMPENSATION OF 
EMPLOYEES 
Group variable: ccode Number of groups= 36 
Time variable: year Observation per group = 26 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
 
WREMPC COMPPC 
 
_1R  0.97563 0.87029 
 
 
(288.79)*** (946.77)*** 
 
_ 2R  -0.13008 -0.03179 
 
 
(-60.31)*** (-30.00)*** 
 
Institutional quality  -0.83482 0.34857 
 
 
(-17.34)*** (18.34)*** 
 
Home-country income  1.16050 -4.50763 
 
 
(1.72)* (-31.63)*** 
 
Host-country income  9.99314 10.44932 
 
 
(7.82)*** (26.92)*** 
 
Rate of inflation  0.01080 0.07092 
 
 
(0.49) (5.83)*** 
 
Bank credit to private sector  0.13479 -0.15802 
 
 
(8.26)*** (-28.38)*** 
 
Real deposit interest rate  0.00501 0.08850 
 
 
(0.23) (6.82)*** 
 
Real exchange rate  -0.00029 -0.00252 
 
 
(-1.78)* (-4.62)*** 
 
Dummy for September 11, 2001  5.41298 2.03112 
 
 
(54.32)*** (31.09)*** 
 
Constant term -105.033 -69.7911 
 
 
(-12.18)*** (-16.25)*** 
 
Number of instruments 442 442 
 Number of observations 1003 1003 
 Wald 2 ( )   609000*** 2250000*** 
 Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2): 
 
        0.2905{0.77} -0.9754{0.33} 
 Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 
2 ( )            28.57{0.99}  33.79{0.99} 
 Source: Author’s estimation. 
Note: */*** indicates significant at 10 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
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Concerning home-country economic conditions, whereas permanent migrants are only 
likely to remit more when income levels at home improve as consistent with the self-interest 
portfolio motive, temporary migrants are likely to remit more when economic conditions at home 
deteriorate.  A percentage rise in home-country income levels induces permanent migrants to 
increase amounts remitted by 1.1605 percent only at 10 percent level of statistical significance. 
However, temporary migrants are inclined to increase amounts remitted by 4.5076 percent 
should home-country income decrease by one percent. One possible reason is that permanent 
migrants are more likely to have „insured‟ their families against negative economic shocks at 
home through past remittances or these permanent migrants might have been joined by their 
closest dependants in the host-country, having acquired legal residential status. This reduces the 
migrant‟s direct responsibilities to those at home and is in contrast with the situation of newly 
arrived migrants.   
When governance and political conditions at home improve by one unit, temporary 
migrants are motivated to increase amounts remitted by 0.34857 units, but official remittances 
from permanent migrants are likely to reduce by 0.83482. This is probably because, unlike 
permanent migrants, temporary migrants being more altruistic-driven (a reason why they remit 
more as home-country income falls and home-country inflation rises), are regular remitters even 
when general socioeconomic conditions at home deteriorate. However, because permanent 
migrants are unlikely to be regular remitters as social ties become weaker between them and 
their families back home as duration of stay abroad increases, they are likely to remit more when 
political conditions at home deteriorate. Probably, some of these permanent migrants are 
encouraged to increase the amount they remit during because of economic or political interest or 
other personal ambitions. With a higher real deposit rate, temporary migrants are likely to remit 
more, probably because they are more likely to return home in the near future and hence they 
need funds to finance entrepreneurial ventures upon return. Just like inflation, a rise in the real 
deposit interest rate of the home-country has no effect on the amount of remittances sent by 
permanent migrants. With improved access to the bank credit of family members back home, 
permanent migrants remit more, probably for self-interest portfolio motives; but temporary 
migrants remit more to lessen the liquidity constraints of those left behind when access to bank 
credit becomes more limited at home. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the empirical results, it can be concluded that over the past three decades, remittances 
from permanent migrants have been the dominant component of total migrant remittances 
received in SSA. Remittances from temporary migrants are relatively more altruistically driven 
whereas those from permanent migrants are more self-interest or investment driven. To this 
extent, as far as remittances are concerned, migrants react differently to macroeconomic 
conditions at home depending upon their duration of stay. This implies that generally initial 
remittances are essentially altruistic. Overtime, remittances tend to be driven by self-interest 
economic motive. However, because altruism is inherent in all other motives of remittances and 
other motives of remittances only become important after altruism, a labor-exporting SSA 
country will receive more remittances on a permanent basis if there is a stable and investment-
friendly macroeconomic environment. In other words, given a sound macroeconomic 
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environment, a typical labor-exporting SSA country can receive higher remittances in excess of 
pure altruism more permanently.  
The findings imply that policymakers in SSA should not be deceived into thinking that 
they can attract higher remittances from permanent migrants without implementing stable and 
pro-growth economic policies. Needless to say, SSA is the sub-region that receives the least 
migrant remittances through official channels due to lack of an appropriate macroeconomic 
policy environment. It is, therefore, recommended that policymakers in SSA should devise 
strategies aimed at achieving a lower rate of inflation, higher and sustained rate of economic 
growth, improved financial market development and exchange rate stability in order to attract 
higher remittances from permanent migrants who sent over 90 percent of total migrant 
remittances received in the sub-region between 1980 and 2009. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Developing countries receive at least 75 percent of reported migrant remittances. In 2009, developing countries alone received 
as much as US$316 billion out of the world‟s total of US$414 billion, representing 76.3 percent even though the amount they 
received in 2009 fell by about 6 percent of the amount they received in 2008 (Author‟s computation based on World Bank 
(2010). 
2 Migrant remittances are the second largest form of non-debt capital inflows in developing countries. In the Middle East and 
North Africa just as in South Asia, it is now the leading source of external capital (see Figure A1 in Appendix). 
3 It is well-known in the remittance literature that official remittances represent an underestimation of the total remittances 
received in developing countries as at least 50 percent of remittances (what is official reported) are sent through unofficial 
channels. 
4 This confirms earlier estimates by Ratha and Shaw (2007). For Africa as a whole, Barajas et al. (2010) observe that more than 
50 percent of African migrants reside in other African countries. 
5 Sander and Maimbo (2003) and Barajas et al. (2010) also identify Europe rather than North America as the main host of 
African migrants. 
6 This is in line with the Lewis (1954) theory of excess supply of labor, resulting in high unemployment and low wages in 
underdeveloped economies, which forces the nationals of these underdeveloped economies to migrate to the industrialised world 
where there is a higher prospect of being engaged in relatively higher income jobs. 
7 A migrant‟s determination to save part of his/her disposable income may also be applicable in this context if he/she is aiming at 
sponsoring a family member in his/her home country to travel abroad. A rational migrant‟s motivation to save can also be driven 
by his/her motivation to hedge against negative income shocks in his/her host country. 
8 In this case 1U is the derivative of utility with respect to home-country consumption. 
9 According to Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006: 86), “similar results can be obtained assuming that, in the second period, the 
migrant returns to the home country and joins the household”. 
10 It was not possible to use real interest rate differential due to data constraints on migrant host countries. Apart from France, 
none of the migrant host nations has a complete data on deposit interest rates. For instance, there are no reported data on 
Germany, Portugal and Great Britain beyond 1999. Belgium and Spain have no reported data on deposit interest rates beyond the 
year 2003 whilst for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, data is non-existent for the years 1980-2003 and 1980-87. USA does not report 
deposit interest rates at all for the entire study period. 
11 In a recent study, Singh et al. (2010) used a similar approach to obtain remittances data on 36 SSA countries. 
12 A single non-SSA migrant-host country rather than say the top-5 migrant-host countries was used because this helps to 
minimize the often illogical statistical reasoning and fundamental errors often associated with aggregation and determination of 
weights for the computation of real exchange rates and real per capita income of migrants especially when these countries are not 
necessarily the major trading partners of SSA countries. The choice of a single non-SSA host country has also helped to reduce 
the occurrence of missing data that had the potential of limiting the scope of this study. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE A1. TRENDS IN EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 1970-2009 
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Source: Author based on World Bank (2010). 
Note: EAP, ECA, LAC, MNA, SAS and SSA denote East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. 
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FIGURE A2. TRENDS IN MIGRANT REMITTANCE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 1970-
2009 
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Figure A2: Migrant Remittances Per Capita Received (in US$)
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Figure A3: Migrant Remittance Flows to Developing Economies 
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Figure A4: Migrant Remittances to Developing Economies
(in millions of US$)
EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA  
Source: Author based on World Bank (2010). 
Note: EAP, ECA, LAC, MNA, SAS and SSA denote East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. 
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TABLE A1. HOST COUNTRIES OF SSA MIGRANTS 
1 2 3 4 5 1: Host 2 3
Benin (BEN) NIG (27.71) BFA (12.68) TOG (12.45) CIV (10.60) GAB (5.59) FRA (2.22) GER (1.30) PAK (1.07)
Botswana (BSW) RSA (18.01) NAM (16.96) GBR (12.47) ZIM (11.64) USA (9.58) GBR (12.47) USA (9.58) AUS (4.27)
Burkina Faso (BFA) CIV (72.47) GUI (11.03) GHA (5.13) DRC (1.38) PAK (1.06) PAK (1.06) GER (1.03) FRA (0.37)
Cameroon (CAM) FRA (22.62) GAB (17.74) NIG (9.91) USA (7.53) GER (5.43) FRA (22.62) USA (7.53) GER (5.43)
Cape Verde (CPV) POR (22.52) USA (13.83) FRA (6.65) GER (6.61) MZQ (8.44) POR (22.62) USA (13.83) FRA (6.65)
Comoros (COM) FRA (43.14) UGA (22.47) GER (7.01) TZA (4.68) LBY (2.59) FRA (43.14) GER (7.01) USA (0.50)
Congo Republic (CON) SUD (47.91) TZA (16.03) FRA (8.34) BEL (2.68) GER (2.29) FRA (8.34) BEL (2.68) GER (2.29)
Côte d'Ivoire (CIV) FRA (27.38) BFA (19.72) GER (5.95) BEN (6.56) GUI (5.40) FRA (27.38) GER (5.95) USA (4.57)
Ethiopia (ETH) USA (25.65) ISR (20.67) SAU (7.72) CAN (5.08) SWE (3.40) USA (25.65) ISR (20.67) SAU (7.72)
Gabon (GAB) SUD (47.30) FRA (19.69) SLE (4.39) GER (3.44) KEN (3.66) FRA (19.69) GER (3.44) USA (0.92)
Gambia (GAM) ESP (12.18) USA (11.95) NIG (8.45) GBR (7.73) SEN (3.67) ESP (12.18) USA (11.95) GBR (7.73)
Ghana (GHA) CIV (31.91) NIG (13.06) BFA (9.74) GUI (8.69) USA (7.31) USA (7.31) GBR (5.97) GER (2.27)
Guinea (GUI) CIV (23.74) LIB (12.11) SEN (18.69) BFA (11.17) GAM (6.57) GBR (1.45) GER (1.34) USA (1.15)
Guinea-Bissau (GBS) SEN (25.45) GAM (13.36) POR (16.72) FRA (6.34) BFA (5.81) POR (16.72) FRA (6.34) GER (4.45)
Kenya (KEN) GBR (28.54) TZA (27.04) UGA (7.35) USA (9.85) GER (5.38) GBR (28.54) USA (9.85) GER (5.38)
Lesotho (LSO) MZQ (46.02) ZIM (19.45) RSA (16.18) MWI (2.38) TZA (1.72) GER (0.82) USA (0.81) PAK (0.71)
Madagascar (MAD) FRA (51.55) REU (12.88) GER (8.64) ZIM (4.22) COM (3.82) FRA (51.55) REU (12.88) GER (8.64)
Malawi (MWI) ZAM (19.03) TZA (18.93) RSA (17.65) ZIM (12.91) GBR (8.30) GBR (8.30) GER (1.93) USA (1.38)
Mali (MLI) CIV (30.82) BFA (27.74) GUI (10.32) NIG (5.77) GHA (5.22) FRA (2.73) GER (1.37) USA (0.45)
Mauritania (MRT) SEN (34.21) NIG (10.32) FRA (8.78) BFA (7.68) GUI (7.56) FRA (8.78) ESP (3.21) GER (2.72)
Mauritius (MRS) FRA (18.41) RSA (18.39) GBR (15.63) AUS (9.70) GER (6.53) FRA (18.41) GBR (15.63) AUS (9.70)
Mozambique (MZQ) TZA (22.78) ZIM (19.98) MWI (19.16) RSA (17.74) POR (8.97) POR (8.97) GER (2.07) GBR (0.50)
Namibia (NAM) MZQ (23.07) RSA (17.28) ZIM (13.13) TZA (1.50) GBR (5.14) GBR (5.14) USA (4.19) GER (1.88)
Niger (NGR) BFA (27.84) CIV (26.25) NIG (11.89) GUI (10.79) GHA (5.16) GER (1.10) PAK (1.06) FRA (0.73)
Nigeria (NIG) SUD (23.76) USA (13.74) GBR (8.60) CAM (8.39) GHA (5.14) USA (13.74) GBR (8.60) GER (2.91)
Rwanda (RWA) UGA (42.17) TZA (27.94) KEN (4.89) BEL (2.83) GER (1.87) BEL (2.83) GER (1.87) USA (1.16)
São Tomé & Príncipe POR (54.97) CPV (15.94) GER (9.30) BFA (3.00) GUI (2.93) POR (54.97) GER (9.30) FRA (1.02)
Senegal (SEN) GAM (20.56) FRA (18.32) ITA (9.58) MRT (8.48) GER (5.30) FRA (18.32) ITA (9.58) GER (5.30)
Seychelles (SEY) GBR (17.40) RSA (18.69) AUS (14.55) ZIM (6.24) TZA (6.18) GBR (17.40) AUS (14.55) CAN (6.15)
Sierra Leone (SLE) USA (22.87) LIB (18.31) GBR (18.18) GHA (5.00) GER (4.50) USA (22.87) GBR (18.18) GER (4.50)
South Africa (RSA) GBR (18.15) MZQ (16.04) AUS (10.12) USA (8.99) ZIM (7.37) GBR (18.15) AUS (10.12) USA (8.99)
Sudan (SUD) SAU (32.05) UGA (24.31) JOR (3.78) USA (3.43) EGY (2.64) SAU (32.05) JOR (3.78) USA (3.43)
Swaziland (SWZ) MZQ (28.48) RSA (17.05) ZIM (14.53) GBR (7.43) USA (5.46) GBR (7.43) USA (5.46) GER (2.30)
Tanzania (TNZ) UGA (20.46) RSA (18.31) GBR (11.48) ZIM (8.81) CAN (6.95) GBR (11.48) CAN (6.95) USA (4.47)
Togo (TOG) NIG (36.10) BEN (12.05) BFA (8.75) GUI (8.84) GAM (6.61) FRA (6.38) GER (2.02) USA (1.63)
Uganda (UGA) GBR (32.41) TZA (23.82) USA (7.38) CAN (6.48) GER (6.06) GBR (32.41) USA (7.38) CAN (6.48)
Migrant Home-Country
Top-5 SSA Migrant Host Countries in the World Top-3 Non-SSA Host Countries
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Parson et al. (2007).  
Note: AUS, CAN, ISR, ITA, LIB, DRC, EGY, REU, SWE, ZAM, ZIM, JOR, and LBY stand for Australia, Canada, Israel, Italy, 
Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Reunion, Sweden, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Jordan and Libya respectively. 
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TABLE A2. DATA DESCRIPTION, MEASUREMENT AND SOURCES 
Variable Notation Description, Measurement and Main Sources 
Dependent Variables 
Workers‟ 
remittances per 
capita 
WREMPC Remittances sent by SSA migrants who spent at least 12 months in a host country. Source: 
2010 Editions of WDI, BoPS and estimates from IMF country-desks as at February 9, 2011. 
Compensation of 
employees per 
capita 
COMPPC Remittances sent by SSA migrants who spent less than 12 month in a host country. Source: 
Author‟s computation based on reported data in WDI, BoPS and estimates from country-
desks information at IMF. 
Explanatory Variables 
Lagged dependent +,-/0
1,2R  The immediate two past values of the dependent variable. In this case, R represents in the 
respective WREMPC and COMPPC estimated models. Source: Author‟s computation. 
Inflation rate INF+/- Rate of growth in annual average consumer price index. Source: WDI, IMF‟s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), and WEO 
Real exchange 
rate 
 
RXR+/- 
The annual average value of the national currency of a sampled SSA country in real terms 
of the national currency of the migrant-host country. Source: Author‟s computation based 
on data from WDI, IFS and WEO. 
Host-country 
income 
MGY+ Real per capita GDP of a typical non-SSA migrant host country. Source: WDI and WEO. 
Home-country 
income 
FMY- Real per capita GDP of a typical SSA country. Source: WDI and WEO. 
Real Deposit 
Interest Rate  
 
RIR+/0 
Average annual deposit rate of a typical SSA country minus average annual CPI-based 
inflation rate. Source: Author based on WDI, IFS, WEO and Central Banks of selected 
countries. 
Domestic credit to 
private sector as 
ratio of GDP 
 
PSC+/- 
Total domestic credit to the private sector by the financial system as a ratio of GDP. Source: 
WDI and the Central Bank website of selected sampled countries. 
 
Institutional 
quality index 
 
INS+/- 
A polity2 index used to capture the qualities of democratic governance and institutions in a 
typical home SSA country. It ranges between -10 for low democratic governance (including 
dictatorship and autocratic regimes) and weak institutions, and +10 for high democratic 
governance and strong institutions. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2011) 
 
Post-September 
11, 2001 
 
D1+ 
A dummy to capture post-September 11, 2001, when the US and other migrant-host 
countries improved regulations on international money transfers, which has discouraged 
migrants from using informal channels to remit. Source: Author’s construction. 
Source: Author.    
Note: The a priori sign is indicated by +/-/0 by the notation column of each variable. 
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